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IS THERE A PRINCIPLE OF 
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY? 
I 
John H. Garvey* 
SECURING RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: PRINCIPLES FOR JUDICIAL 
INTERPRETATION OF THE RELIGION CLAUSES. By Jesse H. Choper. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1995. Pp. xiii, 198. $24.95. 
FOREORDAINED FAILURE: THE QUEST FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL 
PRINCIPLE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM. By Steven D. Smith. New 
York: Oxford University Press. 1995. Pp. ix, 174. $35. 
There is something undeniably alluring about this corner of the 
First Amendment. One reason for its attraction is that the primary 
legal materials are, or seem to be, compact and self-contained. 
There is the language of the First Amendment, 1 178 cases,2 and an 
odd statute or two.3 Cognate areas of constitutional law - like the 
Speech and Press C)auses - have less influence than they maybe 
should, so you safely can feel like you've got a grip on the whole 
field. A second thing is that the law as it now stands has some 
thorny problems built into it. Solving these would be like proving 
Fermat's last theorem. You could make a name for yourself by do-
ing it. A third is that the principle of religious liberty matters a lot 
to people who are religiously serious. Many (though certainly not 
all) of the leading scholars in the field care about it because religion 
plays an important part in their own lives. 
Jesse Choper and Steven Sinith have written two wonderful 
books about the quest for a principle of religious liberty - two 
books that ought to be sold as a set. Choper thinks he has found 
such a principle (more precisely, four of them); Smith thinks this is 
demonstrably impossible. Of course they're both wrong, but I wish 
I could make as convincing a case for this proposition as each of 
them does for his. 
* Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School. A.B. 1970, University of Notre Dame; 
J.D. 1974, Harvard. - Ed. 
1. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the 
free exercise thereof .... " U.S. CONST. amend I. 
2. I take the number from a list privately circulated by Carl Esbeck, entitled U.S. 
Supreme Court Decisions Relating to Religious Liberty (April 1995). This includes memo-
randum decisions, affirmances by an equally divided court, and some statutory cases (Title 
VII, Wagner Act, etc.). 
3. See, e.g., Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1993). 
1379 
1380 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 94:1379 
I 
Choper is an old-fashioned legal scholar who reads cases care-
fully and worries about neutral principles, workable rules, strong 
rights, and legal process. His ilk have made great treatise writers, 
ALI reporters, and casebook writers (he himself has written a 
couple of best-sellers). Until the 1970s it generally was agreed that 
this is what it meant to be a good legal academic. There is disagree-
ment about this now, and less appreciation than there ought to be 
for the qualities that Choper displays in his writing. From the be-
ginning of his career he has worried about the place of religion in 
constitutional law.4 He has given the problem a lot of thought. 
His book is an attempt to improve First Amendment law by re-
stating it in a few clear rules. The rules should be coherent with one 
another and clear enough to solve particular cases. Choper offers 
four - two for each of the religion clauses. Here's a way to keep 
them in mind: 
Free Exercise 1. Intentional 2. Burdensome 
disadvantage effects 
Establishment 3. Intentional 4. Beneficial 
advantage effects 
The main question is whether the government's action threatens 
religious liberty. If it does, it (speaking very generally) will be be 
unconstitutional. Actions that burden religion pose a greater dan-
ger of this than actions that benefit it, so we can treat free exercise 
and establishment differently. Intended effects are more worrisome 
than. unintended ones (for reasons I'll get to), so we can further 
subdivide the free exercise and establishment rules along those 
lines. That's the big picture. Laws get progressively easier to de-
fend as you go from Rule 1 to Rule 4. Intentional harm is almost 
automatically invalid (Rule 1). Burdensome effects warrant relief if 
they're of a certain kind, and if an exemption is not too costly, and 
if the claimant does alternative service, and so on. (Rule 2). Pro-
grams that intentionally favor religion are OK unless they threaten 
religious liberty (Rule 3). Accidental benefits to religion are OK 
even if they do threaten religious liberty, unless they have no secu-
lar effects (Rule 4). 
This scheme would require some changes in the law. The Free 
Exercise Clause would provide more protection than it does: Rule 
2 requires some exemptions from neutral laws that burden religious 
4. His "tenure piece" at the University of Minnesota was Religion in the Public Schools: 
A Proposed Constitutional Standard, 41 MINN. L. REV. 329 (1963). 
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claimants.5 The Establishment Clause on the whole would be more 
permissive than it is: Rule 3 allows some official acknowledgment 
of religion; Rule 4 permits more aid to parochial schools.6 
Opinions vary about whether these would be salutary changes. 
I think they would. Politics aside, Choper's rules have this clear 
advantage over the current law - they are more consistent. Fif-
teen years ago the situation was worse than it is now. The courts 
applied a free exercise rule of accommodation and an establishment 
rule of separation, so that the same practice simultaneously might 
be required and forbidden.7 Recently the law under both clauses 
has been converging on a principle of neutrality, but it's not clear to 
me what we mean by neutrality, and there are still lots of cases that 
don't conform to any such principle. Choper, by contrast, never 
loses sight of the goal of religious liberty. 
There are some internal inconsistencies. One that puzzles me is 
that Choper defines the term "religion" differently for different 
rules (Choper, pp. 64, 103-05). This is not an original sin. Laurence 
Tribe did it some time ago because it had a neutralizing effect on 
other inconsistencies in the old regime, which he favored. A broad 
free exercise definition excused many people from obedience to 
laws they found offensive; a narrow establishment definition re-
duced the attendant friction between the two clauses (which stood 
for the conflicting principles of accommodation and separation).8 
But this doesn't explain Choper's behavior. He gives religion a nar-
row meaning for exemption purposes.9 And his theory does not 
rest on inconsistent principles - he does not believe in separation. 
I think Choper is driven to this inconsistency by a deeper problem 
in his theory, to which I will turn next. For the moment I will just 
say that it's odd to find this sort of wrinkle in a book that makes 
such a virtue of consistency. The First Amendment uses the word 
5. See Employment D.iv. v. Smith, 494 U.S. Fr72 (1990) (eliminating exemptions). Choper 
simply would not reinstate the prior regime. He believes that Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 
398 (1963), is unconstitutional because it provides tax support for religious claimants. See p. 
121. 
6. I'm glossing over many subtleties. You must understand that this is not a set of con-
servative principles masquerading as a theory. Quite the contrary. Choper rejects some 
forms of aid to religion that we long have been accustomed to. He would abolish tax exemp-
tions for churches, and chaplains in the army and the legislature. See pp. 37, 123. Further, he 
is uncomfortable with some of the sectarian support he would allow, but feels driven to it by 
his theory. See pp. 157-58, 189-90. 
7. Compare Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) with Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 
U.S. 703 (1985). 
8. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-6 (1978). Tribe 
abandoned the idea in the second edition of his treatise. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERI-
CAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-6 (2d ed. 1988). 
9. Choper argues that a belief is religious for purposes of Rule 2 if and only if it has (in 
the believer's eyes) extratemporal consequences. See pp. 74-80. 
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"religion" only once.10 We should try pretty hard to give it one 
meaning. 
Let me step back from these details, now, and look at the 
deeper problem. The thing that bothers me most about Choper's 
book is how strangely disembodied his principle of religious liberty 
is. You might suppose that it's self-explanatory: the point of reli-
gious liberty is to let people practice their religion, just as freedom 
of speech lets them speak. We might see then some discussion 
about why religion is important, as in free speech books we inevita-
bly see a theory about why speech is important. It's a pretty close 
analogy. But Choper instead uses the pattern of race discrimina-
tion. This is why intent plays such an important role (as it does in 
equal protection theory), and why we have to think separately 
about laws that give believers an advantage (the issue of affirmative 
action, transposed). 
Are race and religion alike? Here is the argument Choper 
makes for Rule 1: 
Perhaps the strongest justification for strict judicial scrutiny of any 
official attempt to accord persons less than equal respect and dignity 
because of their religious beliefs or race rests in the fact that both 
throughout history and during more recent times, efforts to do so 
have been similarly rooted in "hate, prejudice, vengeance, [and] hos-
tility." ... [B]oth traits have been the strikingly similar objects of 
public (and private) stereotyping, stigma, subordination, and persecu-
tion. . . . [This behavior rests] on assumptions of the "differential 
worth" of religious and racial groups, including judgments of their 
odiousness or inferiority. [pp. 42-43; footnotes omitted] 
There is certainly something in this. The two types of prejudice 
often run together. Think about African slaves, Asian Buddhists, 
Eastern European Jews, Mediterranean Catholics, and Caribbean 
practitioners of Santeria. It may be difficult to say which of the two 
- race or religion - has been the greater cause of their unpopu-
larity. I see nothing wrong with taking account of this in making 
legal rules. 
But if you look at religion from the inside (if you take the be~ 
liever's perspective), this similarity is a coincidence. From the in-
side religion is not a sociological marker but a way of life. The 
worst thing about legal constraints is not that they imply a lack of 
equal respect and dignity, though those are nice to have. It is that 
they make it hard to live the way one ought to. Religion, unlike 
race, is something that people do, and for that reason it has an in-
herent, not just a comparative, value. If religion were really like 
race, then equal treatment always would be constitutional, even if it 
were bad treatment. 
10. See U.S. CONST. amend I. 
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And that is the rule the Supreme Court laid down in 
Employment Division v. Smith. 11 But Choper would overturn 
Smith and forbid burdensome effects (Rule 2). By way of explana-
tion he argues that there is this difference between race and reli-
gion: in effects cases racial minorities are burdened accidentally 
and haphazardly. (Blacks are hurt disproportionately by welfare 
cuts because they are represented disproportionately among the 
poor. But the cuts are not tied to skin color.) By contrast: 
Religion-neutral laws that have the effect of burdening a particular 
religious practice do injure persons because of their religion: even 
though these laws have a fully legitimate public purpose and achieve 
beneficial results generally, all persons who suffer the special opera-
tive consequences adverse to their belief system are necessarily mem-
bers of that religion, and all members of the religion suffer the special 
operative adverse consequences. [p. 60] 
Practitioners of the Native American religion are especially hurt by 
a ban on peyote because that is a rite they all observe. The ban is 
tied to a practice that they consider religious. 
This is an odd argument. The difference that Choper points out 
is real. As I said before, religion, unlike race, is something that 
people do. So a law against doing x is going to be a very accurate 
way of sorting out people whose religion commends x. Sikhs will 
grow their hair, the Amish will skip school, Quakers won't swear, 
Jehovah's Witnesses won't salute. But these groups don't object to 
laws against x because they are harmed in proportionately higher 
numbers than other sociological groups. Nor do they claim that the 
government is out to get them, or that it has broken some agree-
ment by forbidding12 x. Their real complaint is that the law pre-
vents them from living as they should. It has to do with the value of 
doing x. Choper seems to miss this point. 
Or maybe he feels it but doesn't see it - this is also the place 
where Choper introduces his second definition of religion. Under 
Rule 1 religion is a broad and amorphous category: "the deliberate 
disadvantage principle could just as readily be grounded in the First 
Amendment freedoms of speech and association, which ... protect 
a broad range of ideological convictions including religion; as a con-
sequence, the principle requires no judicial definition of 'religion' " 
(p. 44; footnote omitted). Under Rule 2 religion is a narrower and 
sharper idea. An action x is religious if it has extratemporal conse-
quences - if its results may "extend in some meaningful way be-
yond [the actor's lifetime,] either by affecting [her] eternal 
existence or by producing a permanent and everlasting significance 
and place in reality for all persons that follow" (p. 77; footnote 
11. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
12. Or commanding. I'll just say forbidding for the sake of simplicity. 
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omitted). You can see why a person would insist on doing some-
thing like that. If the government forbids x, it's not just a matter of 
equal respect; x is intrinsically important. 
Why doesn't Choper make more of this insight? Why not carry 
it forward into Rule 1 and back into Rule 3?13 I think he would 
improve the argument if he did this and dropped the race analogy, 
which strikes me as a rather artificial way of looking at religion. 
The reason he hesitates is probably this: the theory of ex-
tratemporal consequences, though it is a useful shibboleth, leaves 
out some pretty clearly religious actors and actions. Strict 
Calvinists believe that our actions don't affect our chances of salva-
tion. They get no exemptions under Choper's Rule 2 (p. 75). If we 
use one definition throughout, Calvinists also would be beyond the 
reach of Rule 3. To put it plainly, the government then could estab-
lish strict Calvinism as the official religion of the United States, sup-
port it with tax dollars, and say Calvinist prayers in the public 
schools (pp. 103-04). To avoid this, Choper introduces his ex-
panded definition of religion. I think he would do better to im-
prove the narrower one, and use it throughout. 
One last point - this one about what the First Amendment for-
bids, rather than what it protects. At the beginning of the book 
Choper identifies two principal threats to religious liberty. The first 
(no surprise) is discrimination. The second is" 'forcing [people] to 
pay taxes in support of a religious establishment or religious activi-
ties' " (p. 16; footnote omitted). As you might suppose, this is a 
conceqi Choper draws straight from Jefferson's Bill for Religious 
Liberty and Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance against 
Religious Assessments. It is one that he takes very seriously. It 
leads him to oppose military chaplains, tax exemptions for 
churches, unemployment compensation for sabbatarians, and a 
number of other widely accepted practices (pp. 37, 121, 123). 
I have no quarrel with the idea that the First Amendment for-
bids religious assessments. But I think that Choper oversimplifies 
. that idea for the sake of fitting it into his theory, and that this leads 
him to make mistakes in peripheral cases. He assumes that tax sup-
port is always a violation of religious liberty. I am not so sure. 
Some people object to religious taxes because they will influence 
the religious practices of recipients. Choper is concerned with the 
religious liberty of taxpayers rather than recipients: "public subsidy 
of religion . . . coerces taxpayers either to contribute indirectly to 
their religions or, even worse, to support sectarian doctrines and 
13. With Rule 3 Choper reverts to a broad, amorphous definition. In fact, he says, we 
really don't need a specific definition of "religion," because the rule - such as it is - against 
intentional advantages applies to all "narrow partisan ideologies." Here the freedoms of 
religion, speech, and association all do the same work. Pp. 107, 103·08. 
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causes that are antithetical to their own. convictions" (p. 17). This 
makes sense when we are talking about assessments - taxes col-
lected and paid for a specific purpose, like the Medicare part of the 
social security tax. But the pain becomes abstract when we come to 
the portion of my income taxes that goes to support military chap-
lains. We do not say that .the government violates my freedom 
when it spends my tax dollars to support abortion, or capital pun-
ishment, or nuclear weapons. I think the principle of coercion 
ought to work alike in both sets of cases.14 
I want to stress that I am talking about coercion. The Establish-
ment Clause might be understood to forbid tax support for religion 
even when it is not coercive. We might say that its purpose is to 
forbid institutional arrangements that are unhealthy over the long 
run, as we know religious assessments to be. But this is a more 
flexible principle than the right to religious liberty. Consider the 
case put by Donald Giannella: imagine a society so thoroughly so-
cialized that the government owned all the land, taxed the citizens 
at 100%, and gave people income and property according to their 
needs. In such a society there would be no churches or religious 
support unless it came from the government, and the First Amend-
ment sensibly might be said to require tax support.15 The case is 
different from the one Madison and Jefferson complained about be-
cause the political and market institutions are so different from 
theirs. Our society is not like Giannella's; but neither is it any 
longer like Madison's and Jefferson's. This has some bearing on 
problems like the support of military chaplains, payment of unem-
ployment compensation, and tax exemptions for churches. I think 
Choper oversimplifies them. 
II 
Steven Smith thinks that Chop er (along with a whole lot of 
other people) is barking up the wrong tree. He asserts that 
Choper's project is: 
(1) To find principles of religious liberty that will be neutral in the 
sense that they are acceptable to all citizens. 
(a) In the search for these principles, history can furnish us with a 
"major premise" (Smith, p. 6). 
(b) Scholars like Choper can supply the rest (p. 1). 
14. As my cousin once observed, we otherwise end up with this incongruous rule: It is 
unconstitutional for the government to pay for putting up a creche at Christmas - unless it's 
in a beaker of urine, in which case the government must pay for it (He was referring to an 
exhibit by Andres Serrano that was supported by the National Endowment for the Arts. I 
discuss the problem in Black and White Images, 56 LAW & CoNTEMP. PRoBs., Autumn 1993, 
at 189). 
15. See Donald A. Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Devel-
opment Part II. The Nonestablishment Principle, 81 HARV. L. REV. 513, 522-23 (1968). 
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(2) To have courts enforce these principles on judicial review (pp. 
xii, 1). 
(3) Through a process of "reasoned elaboration" that will give us 
clear and consistent rules (pp. 1, 7). 
Smith dissents on every point. Specifically, he argues that: 
(1) There are no neutral principles of religious liberty (Chapter Six). 
(a) History actually repudiates the idea (Chapters Two and 
Three). 
(b) Scholars can't save us either (Chapters Seven and Eight). 
(2) Courts and judicial review may have no place here (pp. 125-27). 
(3) It might be best to develop rules in a prudential way, rather than 
through reasoned elaboration (pp. 57-61). 
Scholars and judges (Smith says) have taken two different ap-
proaches to find the elusive principle of religious freedom - histor-
ical and theoretical. Consider history first: what it really shows is 
that the framers of the Constitution consciously decided not to 
adopt any principle of religious freedom. This is an observation 
several people have made about the Establishment Clause. When it 
says that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment 
of religion," it means that Congress should not mess with the reli-
gious establishments existing in some states (Massachusetts) and re-
jected in others (Virginia). In a word, its purpose is federalist 
rather than libertarian.16 , 
You can make a pretty good case for this proposition. It hasn't 
made much difference to constitutional theorists because even if it 
cancels out the Establishment Clause, there still may be a principle 
of religious liberty embedded in the Free Exercise Clause. Smith 
says there isn't - the Free Exercise Clause too has a federalist pur-
pose. This sounds funny, because we are used to thinking of the 
two clauses as distinct, maybe even conflicting. (Free exercise pro-
tects religion; the Establishment Clause protects us against reli-
gion.) The text of the First Amendment also makes free exercise 
sound like a right - a libertarian kind of principle. It closely paral-
lels the Free Speech Clause. Thus, Congress shall make no law 
prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]; or 
abridging the freedom of speech. 
So it seems as though the Free Exercise Clause stands for a princi-
ple of religious liberty even if the Establishment Clause does not. 
Smith replies that one cannot refute his position simply by 
showing that the Free Exercise Clause imposes substantive lirnita-
16. See GERARD V. BRADLEY, CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS JN AMERICA 69-81 
(1987); MARK DEWOLFE HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS 1-31 (1965); Akhil 
Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J.1131, 1158-59 (1991); Daniel 
0. Conkle, Toward a General Theory of the Establishment Clause, 82 Nw. U. L. REV. 1113, 
1133 (1988); Joseph M. Snee, Religious Disestablishment and the Fourteenth Amendment, 
1954 WASH. U. L.Q. 371, 389. 
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tions on the power of Congress. Imagine an amendment that said 
"Congress shall make no law regulating school curriculums." That 
too is a substantive limit, but the point might be to leave education 
to the states, not to enshrine a principle of academic freedom. 
Smith does not dispute that the libertarian interpretation is textu-
ally plausible. But he thinks it unlikely that the framers, having put 
in the Establishment Clause because they were unable to agree 
about the proper relation of religion and government, would in the 
next breath adopt a principle to govern that relation. If Smith is 
right about all this, then the current path of constitutional theory is 
a repudiation of original meaning. Since Cantwezz11 and Everson,18 
the federal courts have made federal law for the states. The point 
of the First Amendment, though, may have been to rely on state 
law and limit federal action. 
Consider now the effort to construct a principle of religious lib-
erty through theory. Smith argues that this is actually an impossible 
task: 
The problem, simply put, is that theories of religious freedom seek 
to reconcile or to mediate among competing religious and secular po-
sitions within a society, but those competing positions disagree about 
the very background beliefs on which a theory of religious freedom 
must rest. [p. 68] 
Take Locke's influential argument in A Letter Concerning Tolera-
tion. Locke maintains that religion is not the business of civil gov-
ernment because the magistrate's power "consists only in outward 
force: but true and saving religion consists in the inward persuasion 
of the mind, without which nothing can be acceptable to God."19 
Locke's argument rests on several controversial premises: that 
there is such a thing as salvation; that it is only achieved by volun-
tary faith; that individuals are more or less self-sufficient; that civil 
government has few proper functions and a laissez-faire attitude; 
etc. If we don't accept these, the argument fails. And we don't. 
People in our society make a whole range of assumptions about 
God, human nature, and the business of government. 
Suppose that Smith is right on both points - we won't find a 
principle of religious liberty either in history or in theory. In that 
case it becomes difficult for the courts to enforce the First Amend-
ment in any meaningful way. Judges decide cases by reasoning 
from given premises. Here there are none to push off from. What 
we might expect to see instead is a lot of floundering and inconsis-
tency. And of course that's what we do see. We have a rule that 
17. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). 
18. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
19. JoHN LocKE, A LETIER CONCERNING TOLERATION 18 (2d ed., Liberal Arts Press 
1955) (1689). 
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the government can give parochial schools books but not maps.20 It 
can give parochial school parents tax deductions but not tax cred-
its.21 It is required to pay unemployment compensation to workers 
who are fired because they can't work on the sabbath; but it can't 
ask employers to give people the sabbath off.22 
The usual observation about this state of affairs is that it's a 
mess. It's not, really. It's the kind of rulemaking we get from legis-
latures. Statutes are not drawn by reasoned elaboration from ac-
cepted premises. They don't form a coherent whole. Think how it 
is, Smith says, when you go to the movies. You might see Babe one 
week and Casino the next. There is no theory that unites these 
choices. This is not to say that the choices are irrational or arbi-
trary; you have a reason for each one - it's just that the reasons 
don't follow from the same premise (pp. 57-59). That is how legis-
latures behave. And since there is no principle of religious liberty, 
it's something we should get more comfortable with in this part of 
the law. 
So one conclusion is that this is a better job for legislatures than 
for courts. We also, Smith says, may be safer leaving religious mat-
ters to the legislature. Recent history provides some support for 
this suggestion. The Supreme Court reduced the protection the 
Free Exercise Clause gives us in Employment Division v. Smith. 
Congress restored it in the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. 
More generally: 
The most significant accommodations to religious freedom are found 
in state and federal tax exemptions, in the military conscription law, 
and in federal employment statutes - all legislatively adopted. In-
deed, courts [seem] more inclined to invalidate legislatively mandated 
accommodation on establishment grounds than to order such accom-
modation on free exercise grounds. [p. 126] 
There is a lot to like about Smith's book. He does not follow 
the herd. His argument is honest and unpretentious, and for that 
reason it invites belief. And there are a lot of things that I think he 
is right about. I am not sold on the argument that the Establish-
ment Clause has a federalist purpose. But it's a better argument 
than most people suppose, and Smith makes no bones about it. I 
like the suggestion that First Amendment law should not follow a 
theory. I have said so myself, at least so far as the Establishment 
20. Compare Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) with Meek v. Pittenger, 421 
U.S. 349 (1975). 
21. Compare Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) with Committee for Pub. Educ. v. 
Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973). 
22. See supra note 7. 
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Clause is concemed.23 And as an empirical matter he's right when 
he says that legislatures give religion more protection than courts 
do. That result probably depends on your religion, but it works for 
most people. 
My chief objection concerns Smith's argument about the impos"'" 
sibility of theory. His point, again, is that any theory of religious 
freedom (I used Locke as an example) will rest on controversial 
premises that some people won't accept. If the premises are in dis-
pute, so will be the conclusion - there can be no universally ac-
ceptable principle of religious freedom. This is a powerful 
argument, and Smith articulates it very well. In fact, the argument 
is so powerful that it appears capable of undermining not just the 
religion clauses, but the rest of the First Amendment - indeed all 
of our constitutional liberties. Consider Milton's argument, often 
used to defend the fre~dom of speech: "let [Truth] and Falsehood 
grapple; who ever knew Truth put to the worse, in a free and open 
encounter?"24 This too rests on controversial premises: about the 
nature of human reasoning, the marketplace of ideas, the costs of 
regulation, etc. Or take the case of reproductive freedom. It rests 
on the controversial premise that life has a lower value at concep-
tion than at birth. Any theory of freedom worth fighting for will 
make assumptions about what human beings are like and how they 
ought to behave. 
Let us suppose, as I do, that all this is true. Smith draws from it 
the conclusion that there can be no genuine theory of religious lib-
erty because (he says) any such theory would have to be neutral as 
among competing religious and secular positions, and there can be 
no such thing (Chapter Six). But why does a genuine theory have 
to be neutral? It might be more accurate to say that any liberal 
theory of freedom aspires to be neutral. In liberal theory, as Rawls 
says, the right is prior to the good.25 This means that we hand out 
the right to freedom before we decide what it's for. Freedom is a 
right to make choices. We call reproductive freedom "freedom of 
choice" because it allows a woman to decide whether to give birth 
or not. The freedom of speech protects speakers and people who 
choose not to speak.26 So too with religious freedom. Liberal the..: 
ory purports to be neutral among all these choices. 
Critics of liberalism have argued that it is not really value-free, 
as it pretends to be. Liberals have their own ideas about human 
23. See John H. Garvey, A Comment on Church and State in Seventeenth and Eighteenth 
Century America, 7 J.L. & REL. 275, 277-80 (1989); John H. Garvey, Another Way of Looking 
at School Aid, 1985 SuP. Cr. REv. 61. 
24. JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGmCA 58 (Richard c. Jebb ed., 1918) (1644). 
25. See JoHN RAWLS, ~THEORY OF JUSTICE 31 (1971). 
26. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 
209 (1977}; Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). 
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nature, the good life, and our relations with God and one another. 
These ideas are the premises on which the theory rests. Neutrality 
is just as unattainable for liberals as it is for the rest of us. 
But, to repeat the question I asked a moment ago, why does a 
genuine theory of freedom have to be neutral? Consider this exam-
ple. The world in which my children live is different from the world 
of my childhood. The girls play soccer; the boys swim (on teams). 
None of them know how to throw "like a boy," as we used to say. I 
begin to worry that there will come a time when baseball is no 
longer the national pastime. Schools will not field teams; towns will 
not vie for minor league franchises; zoning laws will make it diffi-
cult to build fields; coaches will forbid their soccer players to play 
because it dulls their foot skills; etc. Next thing you know exercise 
gurus, and then the President's Commission on Fitness, will preach 
against it as a deviant form of sport (the way Soviet art critics used 
to rail against impressionism). Suppose we decide to head off this 
unhappy prospect by enacting a constitutional amendment, the 
Twenty-Eighth, enshrining the freedom to play baseball. (I know 
this is a little hysterical, but it could happen.) It would be odd to 
think of this as a neutral right - to say that it took no position on 
whether it was actually a good thing to play baseball. The very 
premise of this new amendment is that baseball is a glorious thing 
- a better thing, in fact, than soccer or swimming or tai chi or any 
of these new-fangled games. 
This is how it is with our other freedoms, too. Mark De Wolfe 
Howe made the same observation about religious liberty: "Though 
it would be possible, of course, that men who were deeply skeptical 
in religious matters should demand a constitutional prohibition 
against abridgments of religious liberty, surely it is more probable 
that the demand should come from those who themselves were be-
lievers. "27 More generally, we might say that freedoms are rights to 
do things that we deem it especially good or important to do. They 
do not necessarily (as the liberal view would have us believe) pro-
tect the right not to do these things, or the right to do other things. 
Suppose, after the Twenty-Eighth Amendment was ratified, that the 
local public grade school taught baseball in gym class. We would 
not allow children to sit the class out and claim that they had a 
constitutional right not to play baseball. It simply doesn't follow 
that because x is a good thing, not-x also must be. Indeed we might 
presume the contrary. Because baseball is such a good thing, it is a 
cause for regret that any child should grow up without learning how 
to play. 
If we think of freedoms in this way - as rights to do certain 
acts, rather than as rights to make choices - they \vill not appeal to 
27. MARK DEWOLFE HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS 15 (1965). 
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all people. Those who don't care about baseball will have no use 
for the Twenty-Eighth Amendment. But that doesn't make them 
any more controversial than liberal freedoms. Reproductive free-
dom protects contradictory choices about childbirth (for and 
against), and it's very unpopular for precisely that reason. What we 
need to decide about all such rights - religious freedom, reproduc-
tive freedom, freedom of speech, freedom of association, freedom 
to play baseball - is whether they rest on the right principle, not 
whether everyone agrees with it. 
Let me recapitulate. Smith argues that theories of religious 
freedom are doomed to failure: they must be neutral, but they all 
rest on controversial premises. I wonder why a theory of religious 
freedom (or any other kind of freedom) must be neutral. I think 
that nonneutral theories do a better job of explaining why, in real 
life, people support rights to do certain things and not others. I also 
think that neutral theories are no less controversial than nonneutral 
ones. And :finally, I don't think it's fatal to our rights that some 
people dissent. Unanimous consent, like neutrality, is an aspiration 
of liberal theory, which often employs the device of the social con-
tract. But this unanimity is imaginary, like the contract itself. We 
don't need neutrality, unanimity, or a contract to have rights. All 
we need is pretty general and enduring agreement that the govern-
ment shouldn't regulate certain kinds of behavior. Theories of free-
dom try to explain why we feel that way. 
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were to find during that reexamination that the starting premises of 
the New Deal generation, premises that so decisively altered the 
boundary between the public and private spheres of American life, 
were themselves as historically contingent as the traditional prem-
ises about governance that they supplanted? Then we might no 
longer have the inspiring example of the New Deal and its accom-
panying constitutional revolution to serve as a guide for the resolu-
tion of contemporary political and legal issues, but we also might 
have begun to cabin the New Deal in time. We might then learn 
something more about ourselves and how we currently want to gov-
ern and to be governed. 
